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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This article addresses Israeli law’s ambivalence toward the custodial 
suspect’s right to meet with an attorney. This ambivalence may indicate a 
deeper conflict regarding the role of defense counsel in pre-indictment 
proceedings. The conflict heightens when the proceedings concern 
suspects of terrorist offenses who present challenges to law enforcement 
authorities, both in terms of the danger they pose to public safety and in 
terms of their unwillingness to cooperate in the investigation of the terror 
offenses ascribed to them. The United States has entered a new era of 
interrogation of suspects of terrorist offenses following the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 
The United States may now address the question of whether suspects of 
terror offenses should be automatically included within the public safety 
exception rule announced in New York v. Quarles.1 The Quarles ruling 
permits the interrogation of suspects without their having been apprised 
of their right to remain silent and their right to the presence of counsel 
according to the Miranda decision.2
Part II of this article will analyze the defense counsel’s role in the 
investigation proceedings prior to indictment in light of Escobedo v. 
Illinois3 and Miranda v. Arizona.4 Part III will survey the reasons 
militating against permitting a meeting between a suspect and his 
attorney at the investigation stage. Part IV will address the attitude of 
Israeli law toward the suspect’s right to meet with defense counsel. This 
part will present the general endorsement of a right of consultation 
together with an interest balancing approach according to which, under 
certain circumstances, the public interest in law enforcement and 
prevention of offenses overrides the suspect’s interest in meeting his 
defense counsel. According to the interest balancing approach, Israeli 
law permits the delaying of detainee-attorney meetings, particularly in 
cases of detainees suspected of security offenses. Israeli law specifies the 
reasons justifying a delay of the meeting between a custodial suspect and 
his counsel.5 It will become clear that the underlying intention of these 
reasons is to isolate the detainee and pressure him into making a 
statement to his interrogators. Part V will distinguish between the power 
to delay the detainee-attorney meeting in order to permit an investigation 
 1. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
 2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 3. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 4. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 at. 
 5. The Criminal Law Procedure (Powers of Enforcement–Detention) Law 1996, S.H. 1592, 
page 338 § 35 (L.S.I.) [hereinafter Detention Law]. 
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intended to prevent the execution of a future offense and in order to 
permit an investigation in connection with an offense committed in the 
past. 
There is no real controversy regarding the necessity of defense 
counsel to protect both innocent and guilty defendants at trial.6 The 
average defendant lacks the legal knowledge and expertise required to 
deal with legal issues, to effectively cross-examine the prosecution’s 
witnesses, and to develop a defense strategy.7 After the indictment stage, 
the defense attorney plays an important role in preparing the defense’s 
case for trial.8 Even before the indictment, there are interrogatory 
proceedings having an adversary character. Thus, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that the right to counsel arises at the critical stages 
of pretrial proceedings.9 The leading decision in this matter is United 
States v. Wade,10 which promulgated the suspect’s right to counsel 
during the conduct of a lineup.11 The “critical stages” are those particular 
stages where defense counsel’s presence is essential for securing a fair 
 6. Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Law: Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex 
Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 261 (1997). 
 7. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). 
 8. Ralph Ruebener, Police Interrogation: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, the 
Right to Counsel, and the Incomplete Metamorphosis of Justice White, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 
559 (1994). In the United States, the right to counsel arises with the filing of the formal charge, even 
if the investigation has not yet terminated. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
The filing of the formal charge triggers the adversary process, bringing a change in the status of the 
individual’s rights. Hence, from the point charges are filed onward, the police are no longer 
permitted to interrogate the accused regarding matters included in the indictment or to attempt to 
elicit incriminating statements in the absence of his defense counsel. Counsel’s duty is to protect the 
accused person at the time of filing to the same extent he is supposed to protect him during trial. In 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held that the adversary 
process between the State and the individual begins the moment police focus on a suspect and 
attempt to illicit an admission of guilt. Id. at 492. Escobedo was overruled by the Miranda decision, 
384 U.S. 436 at 444, 465-66, which clarified that when using the phrase “focusing of investigation” 
the Escobedo Court was referring to the investigation of a suspect under custodial conditions. 
 9. For example, the arraignment is a critical stage where the accused can be required to 
plead a particular defense, which, if not asserted, waives the defense which may result in the 
conviction of an innocent person. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). Another 
critical stage is the preliminary proceeding, in which a decision is made as to whether there is 
probable cause that the accused has committed the offense. At this stage, the defense attorney can 
attempt to prevent the filing of an indictment by indicating the weakness in the prosecution’s case 
while gaining knowledge of the prosecution’s case against the suspect. See, e.g., Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
 10. 388 U.S. 218, 223-24 (1967). 
 11. The scope of the duty was restricted in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). The United 
States Supreme Court held that only after the filing of the formal charge, when the adversary 
proceeding begins and an individual is confronted with the organized prosecutorial powers of the 
State, does the right to counsel arise. This limitation has been harshly criticized because the same 
rationale for the presence of an attorney also exists before the filing of the formal charge. See, e.g., 
Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. 
L. REV. 141, 210-14 (1984). 
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trial for the accused.12 At these critical stages, unfair processes may be 
utilized which may subsequently damage the accused person’s defense in 
court. Some of these procedural defects, such as conducting a lineup that 
may produce an unreliable identification, can be rectified at the pretrial 
stage. Consequently, as the Court recognized in Wade, defense counsel 
needs to be present in order to effectively discern manipulations and 
weed out procedural defects.13 A suspect is not able to give an accurate 
account of the procedure adopted in the lineup, nor is he able to observe 
defects in the lineup process.14 Tactical considerations may also lead a 
suspect to remain silent.15 In Kariv, the Israeli Supreme Court reached a 
similar conclusion regarding a suspect’s right to have his counsel present 
during lineups.16 Furthermore, the Israeli Supreme Court, unlike the 
United States Supreme Court,17 requires the presence of counsel during a 
photographic display in which the witness has to identify the photograph 
of the offender amid a group of random photos.18
The role of defense counsel in Israeli law is less definitive, and even 
disputed, when it concerns consultation with the suspect at the pre-trial 
stage, in contrast with his role during investigative proceedings which 
carry an adversarial character. In investigative proceedings, the defense 
counsel does not fulfill the classical adversarial role of submitting 
evidence and cross-examining witnesses. A police investigation is 
essentially an inquisitorial process.19 The suspect is not allowed to 
oversee the work of the police officers and respond to its development.20 
It may indeed be claimed that the interrogation is a “critical stage” of the 
criminal proceedings since the earlier a defense attorney is retained 
during an investigation the easier it is to discover exculpatory evidence.21 
Thus, the defense attorney can demand that the police collect specific 
items of evidence or question certain witnesses22 Under Israeli law 
however, the suspect is entitled to full access to the evidentiary material 
 12. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 224-27. 
 13. Id. at 235-36. 
 14. Id. at 230-31. 
 15. Id. at 231. 
 16. Cr.A. 648/77, Karib v. Israel, 32(2) P.D. 729, 743. 
 17. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). 
 18. Cr.A. 429/71, Awad v. Israel, 26(1) P.D. 775, 780. 
 19. Arnold N. Enker & Sheldon H. Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States 
and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 48 (1964). 
 20. H.C. 185/64, Annon v. The Minister of Health, 19(1) P.D. 122, 127-28. 
 21. Marea L. Beeman, Fulfilling the Promise of the Right to Counsel: How to Ensure that 
Counsel is Available to Indigent Defendants 1) Upon Questioning Following Arrest and 2) 
Following Probable Cause Determination and Awaiting Indictment, 27 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 27, 39 (2001). 
 22. DAVID LIBAI, THE LAW OF DETENTION AND RELEASE 182 (1978) (Hebrew). 
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in the prosecution’s file after the indictment,23 while the prosecution is 
not entitled to advance knowledge of the accused’s evidence.24 Attorneys 
accordingly usually only prepare for trial after the indictment has been 
filed against their client. 
 
II.  THE ROLE OF COUNSEL DURING THE INTERROGATION OF A 
CUSTODIAL SUSPECT 
 
The Escobedo25 holding exemplifies the defense counsel’s role in 
advising the suspect during the investigation stages. It also provides a 
good example of how the right to counsel creates the potential for 
obstructing a police investigation and frustrating the discovery of an 
offender. 
In Escobedo, the police prevented a meeting between Escobedo, a 
suspect accused of murdering his brother-in-law, and his defense counsel 
despite the suspect’s and defense counsel’s repeated requests to meet.26 
Escobedo, nonetheless, discussed the suspicions against him with his 
counsel at an earlier stage.27 Escobedo’s defense counsel furthermore 
motioned to him in the interrogation room and made a gesture that 
Escobedo understood as a warning not to say anything to his 
interrogators.28 The interrogators failed to inform Escobedo of his right 
to remain silent and that anything he said could be used against him in a 
court of law.29 After Escobedo had been informed that his accomplice 
claimed that it was Escobedo who had fired the fatal shots, Escobedo 
acceded to his interrogators’ suggestion that he confront his 
accomplice.30 Escobedo then accused his accomplice of being the one 
who pulled the trigger.31 Thus, having admitted knowledge of the 
circumstances surrounding the offense, it became easy to elicit 
information from Escobedo that implicated him in the commission of the 
murder32 and led to his conviction of murder.33
In a majority opinion, the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
Escobedo’s confession was inadmissible due to a violation of his right to 
 23. Criminal Procedure Law, 1982, S.H. 1043 page 43 § 74 (L.S.I.). 
 24. This entitlement is subject to an exception that permits the court to obligate the defendant 
to disclose an expert opinion that he intends to introduce as evidence at trial. Id. at § 83. 
 25. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 26. Id. at 480-81. 
 27. Id. at 479. 
 28. Id. at 480-81 n.1. 
 29. Id. at 483. 
 30. Id. at 482. 
 31. Id. at 482-83. 
 32. Id. at 483. 
 33. Id. 
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counsel.34 The Court stressed Escobedo’s ignorance of the fact that under 
Illinois law an accomplice to a murder bears full liability for the 
murder.35 If Escobedo had access to defense counsel, he could have been 
informed of this legal position and avoided making incriminating 
remarks.36 Because a suspect’s remarks during an interrogation can have 
a potential harm on the defendant’s case, the right to counsel during an 
investigation is intimately connected to the right to counsel during the 
trial.37
In the event of a confession, the trial becomes “an appeal from the 
interrogation,” and the right to counsel during trial becomes a 
formality.38 A cynical prosecutor might quip that once a confession is 
obtained, it does not matter who the defendant retains as defense counsel, 
it will be near impossible to overcome this confession at trial.39 The 
Escobedo Court criticized both the exploitation of a detainee’s ignorance 
of his constitutional rights and the fear of the police that a defense 
counsel’s presence would induce the suspect to invoke his right against 
self-incrimination.40 Utilizing the interests balancing approach, the 
United States Supreme Court decided in favor of the suspect’s need to be 
aware of his right against self-incrimination.41 Requiring a suspect to 
confront a grave accusation, while denying him access to the rights to 
deal with that confrontation, offends the notions of fairness and 
equality.42 The Court did not regard Escobedo’s confession as being 
obtained under duress as his confession had not been obtained by force, 
threats, or unfair temptations.43 Nonetheless, the Court excluded the 
confession on the basis of a violation of the right to defense counsel who 
could have informed him of his rights and of the legal consequences of 
his actions.44
The seminal Miranda ruling stressed that the right to counsel before 
the indictment and prior to the onset of adversary proceedings accrues in 
 34. Id. at 486, 491. The United States Supreme Court held that the suspect’s right to 
representation by counsel was infringed. This right is fully entrenched in the Sixth Amendment. See 
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda Court held that the constitutional right 
violated by a breach of a custodial suspect’s right to assistance of counsel is the right against self-
incrimination, not the right to representation by defense counsel. This right is fully entrenched in the 
Fifth Amendment. 
 35. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 486. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 487. 
 39. Id. at 488. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 490. 
 43. Id. at 484. 
 44. Id. at 486, 490-91. 
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custodial interrogations where the right of the suspect against coerced 
self-incrimination is in jeopardy.45 As such, the Miranda decision 
clarified Escobedo, which also dealt with custodial interrogations.46 The 
police are only obliged to inform a suspect of his rights to silence and 
counsel during custodial interrogations.47 These two elements—
interrogation and the suspect’s detention—constitute the threshold 
situation for triggering the Miranda ruling.48 Custody must be formal or 
a functionally equivalent deprivation of freedom of movement to a 
degree associated with formal arrest.49 Interrogation is explicit 
questioning, or its functional equivalent in terms of words or police 
conduct, that the police officer should reasonably expect to elicit an 
incriminating admission from the suspect.50 The interrogation must 
reflect an element of coercion beyond the extent inherent in the custody 
itself.51
How can defense counsel aid a suspect undergoing a custodial 
interrogation? In a number of decisions the Israeli Supreme Court has 
pointed out that the suspect’s right to counsel prior to an indictment is 
“no more than another aspect of the right to remain silent.”52 This is in 
 45. 384 U.S. 436, 465-66 (1966). 
 46. In Miranda, the Court referred to the right to defense counsel due to the focusing of the 
investigation on the suspect, which in essence commences an adversarial proceeding. See Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429-30 (1986); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 n.4 (stating that “[t]his is what we 
meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused”). 
 47. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 
1125 (1983); Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison 
of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 44 (1986). 
 50. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1980). Innis is the leading case addressing 
the meaning of interrogation under Miranda. Innis, a murder suspect, was traveling in a police 
wagon with three police officers. Id. at 294. Two of the officers did not address him directly, but 
rather were talking between themselves. Id. at 294-95. One officer mentioned that there was a whole 
bunch of handicapped children running around the murder site and that only God knows what might 
happen if one of them was to find the weapon. Id. at 295. Hearing this conversation, Innis said to the 
officers “stop, turn around, I’ll show you where it is” and directed them to the location of the murder 
weapon. Id. The police officers notified Innis of his rights prior to reaching the scene of the offense. 
Id. Innis’s incriminating confessions as well as the weapon were introduced as evidence in his trial 
and led to his conviction of murder and kidnapping. Id. at 295-96. The Innis Court ruled that there 
had been no interrogation since he had not been exposed to a direct questioning or its functional 
equivalent. Id. at 302. The conversation between the police officers was short. Id. at 303. They had 
no cause to expect, and in fact there was no indication that they expected, the suspect would show 
any particular sensitivity for the fate of handicapped children and that he would reveal incriminatory 
details after hearing their conversation. Id. at 302. Nor was there anything to show that the suspect 
had been in a mental state of depression or over sensitivity. Id. at 302-03. 
 51. Id. at 300. 
 52. Cr.A. 96/66, Tau v. Attorney General, 20(2) P.D. 539, 545-46; Cr.A. 115, 168/82, 
Mooadi v. Israel, 38(1) P.D. 197, 231; H.C. 3412/91, Soofian v. IDF Commander in Aza Zone, 47(2) 
P.D. 843, 847. 
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fact the essence of Miranda.53 In Miranda, the custodial suspect’s right 
to counsel was not predicated on the adversarial right to a counsel, but 
based on the suspect’s right against self-incrimination.54 In-custody 
questioning is intrinsically coercive and as such places heavy pressure on 
the suspect to speak.55 The custodial suspect has been removed from his 
natural surroundings and placed into an isolated, unfamiliar and hostile 
environment.56 He is surrounded by police officers who are indifferent to 
his welfare and who are trained in coercive methods of persuasion.57 The 
entire atmosphere of the custodial interrogation is structured to subjugate 
the free will of the person under investigation.58 As such, it may diminish 
the willpower of the suspect, creating a situation in which the suspect 
involuntarily speaks and confesses his guilt.59 Statements made under 
such conditions cannot seriously be regarded as the product of a 
defendant’s free choice.60 The United States Supreme Court specified a 
number of concrete procedural prophylactic measures to overcome this 
coercive situation and ensure the “voluntariness” of the confession.61 The 
investigating authorities must apprise the suspect of his right to silence, 
right to communicate with a private or public defense counsel, right to 
have that counsel present during an interrogation, and that his comments 
may be used to implicate him.62 Investigating authorities must also allow 
a suspect to effectuate those rights.63 If the investigating authorities fail 
to apprise the interrogatee of these rights, there is an irrefutable 
presumption that any admission was obtained under conditions of 
coercion and duress, and is therefore involuntary and inadmissible at 
trial.64 The psychological pressures inflicted on a suspect during an 
interrogation can easily overcome him.65 A detainee being interrogated in 
isolation is far more vulnerable to coercion than a suspect permitted to 
meet with his counsel.66 The presence of defense counsel is essential to 
counteract the compulsion and pressure inherent in custodial detention. 
 53. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. 
 54. Id. at 466. 
 55. Id. at 458, 467. 
 56. Id. at 461. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 457. 
 59. Id. at 461. 
 60. Id. at 458. 
 61. Id. at 467. 
 62. Id. at 467-68. 
 63. Id. at 444, 479. 
 64. Id. at 468-69. 
 65. Id. at 447-55. 
 66. Leonard H. Leigh, The Protections of the Rights of the Accused in Pre-Trial Procedure: 
England and Wales, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 41 (John A. Andrews ed., 1982). 
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The right to counsel is therefore necessary to protect the custodial 
suspect’s right against self-incrimination.67
Escobedo and Miranda indicate that defense counsel’s role is to 
explain to the detainee his rights, primarily his right against self-
incrimination.68 During an interrogation, defense counsel must assist the 
suspect in deciding on whether to remain silent or to give a statement.69 
Defense counsel must ensure that any admission is made voluntarily and 
reflects the true will of the suspect. In addition, defense counsel should 
explain the substantive law to the detainee, instruct the detainee 
regarding the kinds of searches to which he is obliged to consent, and 
make the client aware of the statutory duration of the detention.70 
Furthermore, defense counsel can strengthen the morale of the detainee. 
During interrogation proceedings, counsel can reassure the suspect 
that he does not stand alone, demand that the interrogators provide his 
client with proper conditions of confinement, and generally redress the 
imbalance of power between his client and the State. Allowing a suspect 
the assistance of counsel will force interrogators to be wary of employing 
illegal methods of persuasion or of making unreasonable demands of a 
suspect.71 The Miranda decision, as affirmed in Dickerson,72 elucidates 
the unique and irreplaceable role of defense counsel in protecting the 
custodial suspect against coerced self-incrimination.73 However, it should 
be noted that even when a suspect desires to voluntarily cooperate with 
law enforcement authorities, defense counsel should be able to advise the 
suspect of his legal rights, to ensure a suspect will not give even a 
voluntary statement clearly against his interests. 
 
III.  THE REASONS FOR OPPOSITION TO PERMITTING MEETING OF 
CUSTODIAL SUSPECT AND COUNSEL 
 
Defense counsel is charged with assisting the detainee in avoiding 
statements that are not the product of his sincere informed desire to 
 67. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 469. 
 68. See also Regina v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 176 (holding that “the most important 
function of legal advice upon detention is to ensure that the accused understands his rights, chief 
among which is his right to silence”); Regina v. Brydges [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190, 206. 
 69. Hebert, 2 S.C.R. at 177; George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road of Miranda v. 
Arizona? On the History and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 22 
(2000). 
 70. Enker & Elsen, supra note 19, at 85. 
 71. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470; Robert K. Calhoun, Confessions and the Right to Counsel: 
Reflections on Recent Changes in Turkish Criminal Procedure, 6 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 61, 
63 (2000). 
 72. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 73. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979). 
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cooperate with interrogators or even in avoiding statements that are 
inimical to his interests. Therefore, it is easy to understand why the 
presence of counsel during the investigative stages is criticized. The 
conflict between the need of police to gather evidence and the need of 
the suspect to have access to legal consultation at the investigative stage 
may militate against the suspect’s right to consult with defense counsel. 
Confessions are an important tool in the investigation of the truth and the 
enforcement of the law.74 Historically, an admission of guilt has been 
considered the “Queen of Evidence.”75 The United States Supreme Court 
recognized that an admission of guilt is more than just “desirable.”76 
Confessions, in general, are actually “essential to society’s compelling 
interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the 
law,”77 and can be crucial to determining the guilt of the defendant. 
Supporters of the “Crime Control” model emphasize the need for 
effective enforcement of the criminal law and the desirability of 
admissions.78 Accordingly, they oppose any meeting between the suspect 
and counsel.79 The suspect is often the best source of information.80 
Without the cooperation of suspects, many crimes would remain 
unsolved.81 Perpetrators of offenses do not usually surrender themselves 
to the police.82 Obtaining a confession usually entails pressure by the 
police through detention and interrogation.83 The suspect’s detention is 
necessary to give the police a reasonable opportunity to investigate the 
suspect in solitary conditions before the suspect has an opportunity to 
fabricate a story or decide not to cooperate with the interrogators.84 
Isolating a suspect from his family and defense counsel limits external 
interference that can reduce the chances of the suspect cooperating 
during an interrogation.85 Defense counsel constitutes an obstacle to law 
 74. Anthony X. McDermott & H. Mitchell Caldwell, Did He or Didn’t He? The Effect of 
Dickerson on the Post-Waiver Invocation Equation, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 863, 871 (2001). 
 75. Stephen C. Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 581, 581 (2001) 
(stating that “[h]istorically, confessions of guilt have been the ‘best evidence in the whole world’”). 
 76. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986). 
 77. Id. 
 78. The “Crime Control Model” is one of two models that describes, according to Professor 
Herbert Packer, the nature of criminal proceedings and the way the proceedings strike the balance 
between law enforcement needs and human rights. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-73 (1968). The Crime Control Model, as opposed to the Due Process 
Model, gives clear priority to the demands of law enforcement. Id. at 158. 
 79. Id. at 188. 
 80. See id. at 187; see also McDermott & Caldwell, supra note 74, at 870-71; Michael 
Edmund O’Neill, Undoing Miranda, 2000 BYU L. REV. 185, 188. 
 81. PACKER, supra note 78, at 187. 
 82. Van Kessel, supra note 49, at 144. 
 83. Van Kessel, supra note 49, at 144. 
 84. PACKER, supra note 78, at 187. 
 85. Id. at 188. 
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enforcement by advising a suspect of his right to remain silent, assisting 
the suspect to resist interrogatory pressures, and by helping the suspect 
avoid entrapment efforts. Defense attorneys place the interests of their 
clients above that of law enforcement authorities’ duty to seek the truth. 
Law enforcement authorities should be equipped with the tools necessary 
to fulfill their duties. Consequently, investigating authorities should be 
allowed a reasonable period of time to conduct an investigation, before a 
suspect should be permitted to meet with defense counsel.86
Admittedly, coerced confessions of suspects must be avoided. 
However, there is no intrinsic value for society in encouraging suspects 
to avoid confessing guilt or not to cooperate with the police in their 
investigation.87 Yet this is the consequence of allowing detainee-attorney 
consultation during the investigatory stages, thereby handicapping law 
enforcement agencies in the discharging of their duty to expose the truth, 
enforce the law, and protect the public.88 There is nothing abhorrent in 
voluntary confession.89 Justice Scalia, in his Dickerson dissent, averred 
that there is a world of difference between compelling an accused to 
incriminate himself and preventing him from doing so of his own 
volition.90 The identification and conviction of criminals is frequently the 
result of the criminal’s own stupidity.91 According to Justice Scalia, the 
right to counsel and the obligation to give notice thereof protects the 
second situation of a suspect incriminating himself.92 The presence of 
counsel is not technically necessary to inform the suspect of his right to 
silence as the interrogators are charged with this duty.93 However, 
counsel, as opposed to the interrogator, will advise the detainee to 
exercise this right to keep silent.94 In an adversarial system, defense 
counsel’s role in contributing to the uncovering of the truth at trial is not 
 86. O’Neill, supra note 80, at 191-92; Stewart Field & Andrew West, A Tale of Two 
Reforms: French Defense Rights and Police Powers in Transition, 6 CRIM. L.F. 473, 486 (1995) 
(presenting a prevalent view in France that the police should be allowed an initial period of 
investigation undisturbed by giving rights to suspects, such as rights to silence and counsel, that can 
impede the investigation). 
 87. Moran v Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426-27 (1986). 
 88. See Leigh, supra note 66, at 43-44. 
 89. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 449-50 (2000). 
 90. Id. at 449. 
 91. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166-67 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 92. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 449. 
 93. This is based on the assumption that the interrogators are diligent in the discharge of their 
duty, which is not always the case in practice. See Missouri v. Seibert’s ruling on the 
unconstitutionality, under Miranda, of the “question-first” tactic employed by some police 
departments that entails giving no warnings of the rights to silence and counsel until confession has 
been extracted. 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2605 (2004). 
 94. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 449. 
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disputed.95 However, it is claimed that prior to an indictment, defense 
counsel does not necessarily contribute to discovering the truth to the 
same extent,96 and that his presence even serves to conceal rather than 
reveal the truth.97 By advising the suspect to invoke his right to silence, 
defense counsel prevents the submission of voluntary confessions. In 
doing so, he protects no interest and only makes it more difficult to prove 
the suspect’s guilt.98 A defense attorney will not advise his client to 
confess his guilt early on in the process because he stands to gain nothing 
in comparison to the advantage he can gain at a later stage during 
negotiations with the prosecution.99 The suspect is better advised to 
remain silent than make a false statement since submission of a false 
statement may entrap the suspect, thus substantiating his guilt beyond 
any reasonable doubt.100 Indeed, counsel’s presence during the 
interrogation can affect the result of the trial irrespective of the suspect’s 
innocence or guilt. 
The suspect should not have an automatic right to have an attorney 
present during interrogatory procedures. There need not be a 
constitutional right of counsel whenever counsel can benefit the 
suspect.101 It may even be argued that the police should not be required to 
advise the suspect not to cooperate with them through informing the 
suspect of his rights to silence and counsel, for this is tantamount to 
obligating the police to actively thwart their own investigation.102 In 
Moran v. Burbine, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the 
Constitution does not compel the police to provide a suspect with all of 
the information necessary for a suspect to make an informed decision 
whether to make a statement or remain silent103 The Court determined 
that imposing that kind of duty on the police would cause unwarranted 
harm to the interests of law enforcement.104
Some commentators hold that there are other potentially effective 
methods of protecting the accused from coercion, apart from the 
 95. Enker & Elsen, supra note 19, at 66. 
 96. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, ‘Truth in Criminal Justice’ Series Office of 
Legal Policy: The Law of Pretrial Interrogation, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 437, 505-07 (1989). 
 97. Arnold N. Enker & Sheldon H. Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States 
and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 66 (1964). 
 98. Id. at 66-67. 
 99. Id. at 68. 
 100. Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-
Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430 (2000). 
 101. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 496 (1964) (White, Clark, Stewart, JJ., dissenting). 
 102. M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons from the Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth Amendment, 
68 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 259 (2002). 
 103. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986). 
 104. Id. at 422, 426. 
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presence of counsel, while not thwarting an interrogation. One such 
method is filming the suspect’s statements on video.105 Videotaping the 
interrogation in the absence of counsel can largely, but not absolutely, 
ensure the propriety of the interrogator’s conduct and of the methods 
utilized for interrogating the suspect. However, videotaping cannot dispel 
the inherent pressure of a custodial interrogation as articulated by the 
Miranda Court.106 This is so because it is not sufficient to require the 
police to inform the detainee of his rights in order to neutralize that 
pressure. Academic studies indicate the large extent to which 
interrogators apply psychological pressure on a detainee in order to 
obtain a waiver of the rights to silence and counsel.107 For example, the 
interrogators may persuade the detainee that it is better for him to tell the 
truth or make some kind of statement than to remain silent. There is a 
substantial and substantiated fear that the police will present information 
in a skewed and biased manner and therefore it is difficult to rely on the 
police to give detainees objective answers regarding their rights. This is 
not an issue of malice on behalf of police. There is an inherent conflict of 
interest between the desire to advance the interrogation by obtaining any 
incriminating information from a suspect and the duty to explain to the 
suspect his right not to cooperate in the interrogation. The detainee is 
unlikely to ask the same questions of police as he would of his own 
attorney when he apprehends that even his questions might incriminate 
him. Videotaping an interrogation does not overcome the suspect’s fear; 
and thus, videotaping an interrogation does not satisfy the rationale of 
Miranda. The Miranda Court noted the necessity of counsel’s presence 
during the interrogation in order to mitigate the danger of subjugating the 
will power of the detainee to that of his interrogators.108 The Court ruled 
that the atmosphere of the custodial interrogation could easily crush the 
detainee’s resistance when the interrogators, and not defense counsel, are 
informing him of his rights.109
Contrary to the desire to give a suspect as many protections as 
possible to ensure the voluntary nature of his confessions, it has been 
claimed that, as a matter of principle, the police duty to inform the 
 105. See Paul G. Cassell, The Costs of the Miranda Mandate: A Lesson in the Dangers of 
Inflexible, “Prophylactic” Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 311 (1996); Paul G. 
Cassel, Debate: Will Miranda Survive? Dickerson v. United States: The Right to Remain Silent, the 
Supreme Court, and Congress, 37 AM. CRIM L. REV. 1165, 1190 (2000); Richard A. Leo, Criminal 
Law: The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 681-82 (1996) (arguing, 
outside of the context of the right to counsel, “that substantive due process requires that we legally 
mandate the electronic-recording of custodial interrogations in all felony cases.”). 
 106. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447-55 (1966). 
 107. See Leo, supra note 105, at 658-65. 
 108. 384 U.S. at 469-70. 
 109. Id. 
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suspect of his rights cannot be reconciled with the permit given for 
custodial interrogation.110 Actually, there are only a few commentators 
who challenge custodial interrogation.111 The English House of Lords has 
even maintained that it is legitimate to detain a suspect in order to induce 
him to cooperate with the police.112 English police can therefore exploit 
the pressure and tension attendant to the denial of freedom.113 It therefore 
can be claimed that the tension inherent in custodial investigation is an 
essential, justified means for an effective interrogation. According to this 
line of thinking, it might be argued that only weak justification exists for 
granting procedural guarantees, such as rights to silence and counsel, to 
absolutely dispel the pressure of custodial interrogation. Instead, 
guarantees should be established that lessen the fear of exaggerated 
pressures, such as physical violence or the threat of violence, which can 
substantially diminish the voluntariness of the suspect’s confession.114
 
IV.  THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL REGARDING THE 
CUSTODIAL SUSPECT’S RIGHT TO MEET WITH COUNSEL 
 
A.  The General Principle in Israel—Recognition of the Custodial 
Suspect’s Right to Consult with His Attorney 
 
How does Israeli law resolve the conflict between the suspect’s 
interests and law enforcement needs? The Detention Law provides a 
detainee the right to meet and consult with an advocate.115 The officer in 
charge must immediately arrange such a meeting at the detainee’s 
request.116 The Israeli Supreme Court has held in two separate rulings 
that the custodial suspect’s right to communicate with an attorney derives 
from his right to personal freedom found in section five of the Basic 
Law: Human Liberty and Dignity.117 Nonetheless, in other cases the 
Court has articulated that the question of whether a suspect’s right to 
counsel is a constitutional right remains to be decided.118 The Detention 
 110. O’Neill, supra note 80, at 191. 
 111. Enker & Elsen, supra note 19, at 85. For a position denying the legality of custodial 
interrogation see Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the 
Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 110 (1989). 
 112. Mohammed-Holgate v. Duke, 3 All. E.R. 526, 531 (Q.B. 1983). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See, Note, Developments in the Law–Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 1002 (1966). 
 115. Detention Law, 1996, S.H. 1592 page 338 § 34(a) (L.S.I.). 
 116. Id. at § 34(b); Cr.A. 307/60, Yasin v. Attorney General, 17 P.D. 1541, 1570. 
 117. H.C. 3412/91, Soofian v. IDF Commander in Aza Zone, 47(2) P.D. 843, 850-51; H.C. 
3425/01, Tarek v. Minister of Defense, 55(4) P.D. 581, 583. 
 118. Cr.A. 6613/99, Smirk v. Israel, 56(3) P.D. 529, 554-56; Cr.A. 5203/98, Hasson v. Israel, 
56(3) P.D. 274, 283. 
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Law specifies a number of means for giving effect to the suspect’s right 
to meet counsel. For example, the detainee must be able to speak with his 
counsel under conditions of privacy to ensure confidentiality of the 
discussion.119 In addition, notification of his arrest must be given 
immediately to a person close to him.120 The officer in charge must also 
inform the detainee of his right to either retain his own attorney or have 
one appointed for him.121 According to the Israeli Supreme Court, the 
police have no obligation to remind a detainee of his right to counsel at 
the commencement of each interrogation; but when the interrogation is 
protracted, the police should occasionally remind the suspect of his 
rights.122 The police must provide the detainee a list of advocates, 
prepared by the Advocates’ Bar, who are willing to represent 
detainees.123 However, the police are under no obligation to allow the 
detainee to directly contact an attorney other than through a police 
officer.124 The Detention Law does not grant the detainee the right to 
have counsel present during an interrogation.125 This is distinct from 
counsel’s ability to meet and consult with a suspect prior to and in 
between interrogations.126 Contrary to Edwards v. Arizona,127 the Israeli 
Supreme Court ruled that there is no obligation to stop an interrogation 
when the detainee expresses a desire to communicate with an attorney.128 
Additionally, in contrast to Miranda, the Israeli Supreme Court has held 
that the failure to apprise a detainee of his right to remain silent or right 
to counsel is only one factor to be considered in the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding a confession and is not alone sufficient to 
automatically render the suspect’s confession involuntary.129 It should be 
 119. Detention Law, 1996, S.H. 1592 page 338 § 34(c). 
 120. Id. at § 33(a). This article does not define the degree of affinity between the detainee and 
the person who will receive notice of his detention, leaving the detainee latitude to designate the 
person who will receive notice. 
 121. Id. at § 32(1). 
 122. Cr.A. 334/86, Sabach v. Israel, 44(3) P.D. 857, 866. 
 123. Detention Law, 1996, S.H. 1592 page 338 § 33(c). 
 124. Detention Law § 33(b) requires only that the attorney named by the detainee be notified 
of the detention. In practice, often times the police officer will make the initial phone call informing 
the attorney of the detention. 
 125. Detention Law § 34 only grants the detainee the general right to consult with a lawyer 
without referring to his right to have counsel present during the interrogation. Although this law does 
not explicitly deny the right to presence of counsel during interrogation, in practice, counsel is not 
allowed to be present in the interrogation room. 
 126. Id. 
 127. 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). 
 128. Cr.A. 533/82, Zakkai v. Israel, 38(3) P.D. 57, 66-68; Cr.A. 5203/98, Hasson v. Israel, 
56(3) P.D. 274, 282. 
 129. Cr.A. 115, 168/82, Mooadi v. Israel, 38(1) P.D. 197. According to this ruling, only 
extremely illegitimate measures create an absolute presumption that the suspect’s confession was not 
free and voluntary. 
    
220 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 19 
 
noted that, to date, Israeli case law has not endorsed the exclusionary rule 
by which evidence obtained by illegal means is not admissible at trial.130 
Consequently, a voluntary confession obtained in contravention of the 
law is still admissible at trial. 
 
B.  The Interest Balancing Approach 
 
Israeli Law recognizes the importance of the suspect’s right to 
counsel although it gives it less weight than in American Law. However, 
even though Israeli law recognizes a custodial suspect’s right to counsel, 
the Israeli Detention Law, by enabling judges and law enforcement 
authorities to postpone the detainee-attorney meeting, does not create an 
absolute right to counsel.131 The goal, as reflected in the provisions of the 
Detention Law, of striking a balance between the right to counsel and the 
need to combat crime is articulated in the Israeli Supreme Court ruling, 
averring that in opposition to the right to communicate with an advocate: 
 
[T]here are important public interests such as combating crime, 
protection of state security and public peace, exposure of the truth, and 
the need to protect the rights of the victim of an offense who was 
harmed as a result of the criminal act. What is required therefore is a 
delicate and complex balance between a variety of competing values 
and interests, in accordance with the values of our legal system.132
 
The difficulty of balancing individual rights and law enforcement needs 
becomes even more acute when dealing with suspects of terror offenses 
and offenses against state security.133 The following sections will 
specifically address the way in which the Israeli Supreme Court balances 
state security with the detainee’s right to counsel. 
 
C.  Identification of Overriding Interests that Justify the Delay of 
Detainee-Attorney Meeting 
 
In light of this balance, the Israeli Detention Law permits the delay 
 130. Id.; F.H. 9/83, Military Court of Appeals v. Vaknin, 42(3) P.D. 837. In Israel there are 
only two laws that provide the exclusionary rule as a discretionary rule: (1) Secret Monitoring Law, 
1979, S.H. 938 page 118 § 13 (L.S.I.); and (2) Protection of Privacy Law, 1981, S.H. 1011 page 128 
§ 32 (L.S.I.). 
 131. Detention Law, 1996, S.H. 1592 page 338 § 34(d), 34(e), 35. 
 132. Cr.A. 6613/99, Smirk v. Israel, 56(3) P.D. 529, 555. Regarding the need to balance 
between the interests of the suspect and the needs of the investigation, see O’Neill, supra note 80, at 
188. 
 133. M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 
12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 322 (2003). 
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of detainee-attorney meeting. Even before the detainee’s right to meet 
with an attorney and the scope of this right was enshrined in law, the 
Israeli Supreme Court ruled that in exceptional cases where the police 
had just cause, they are entitled to delay such a meeting.134 The current 
Detention Law provides what constitutes “just cause” necessary for 
postponing the meeting. When a detainee is involved in an interrogatory 
or other investigation action that requires his presence—such as 
reconstructing the commission of an offense—and the interruption or 
postponement of that interrogation would materially impede the 
investigation, a Superintendent or higher officer in charge of the 
investigation may, upon written order, delay the meeting for a few 
hours.135 The meeting can be postponed for up to twenty-four hours after 
the arrest if the officer in charge believes that a meeting between the 
detainee and the advocate would obstruct the arrest of additional suspects 
in the same matter and prevent the discovery of evidence in connection 
with that offense.136 A meeting can be postponed for forty-eight hours if 
the officer in charge deems it is necessary to protect human life or 
frustrate a future crime.137 It is rare to postpone a meeting between an 
advocate and a detainee not suspected of security offenses for more than 
a few hours. Conversely, when custodial suspects of security offenses are 
involved, the power to postpone the meeting is routinely exercised. The 
permitted period of postponement for suspects of security offenses is up 
to twenty-one days if (1) the meeting would interfere with the arrest of 
other suspects; (2) the meeting would disrupt the discovery or seizure of 
evidence, or impede the investigation in some other manner; or (3) if the 
prevention of the meeting is necessary to frustrate a future offense or to 
protect human life.138 The President of a District Court can postpone the 
meeting for twenty-one days,139 while the authority of the officer in 
charge is limited to postponing the meeting for ten days.140 The Israeli 
Supreme Court has ruled that it is mandatory to immediately inform the 
detainee of the decision to postpone his meeting with his defense 
counsel.141 The rationale for this notice is founded in a person’s right to 
be aware of any change in the status of his rights as well as to allow the 
 134. Cr.A. 307/60, Yasin v. Attorney General, 17 P.D. 1541, 1570. 
 135. Detention Law, 1996, S.H. 1592 page 338 § 34(d); Cr.A. 115, 168/82, Mooadi v. Israel, 
38(1) P.D. 197, 232. 
 136. Detention Law, 1996, S.H. 1592 page 338 § 34(e). 
 137. Id. at § 34(f). 
 138. Id. at § 35(a). 
 139. Id. at § 35(d). 
 140. Id. at § 35(c). 
 141. H.C. 3412/91, Soofian v. IDF Commander in Aza Zone, 47(2) P.D. 843, 852-53; H.C. 
3425/01, Tarek v. Minister of Defense, 55(4) P.D. 581, 583. 
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detainee to take action to realize the infringed right.142 For example, a 
detainee is entitled to appeal the decision to postpone the detainee-
attorney meeting.143 However, failure to notify the detainee of his right to 
object will not necessarily result in the exclusion of any statements made 
by him in the absence of his counsel.144 Furthermore, during appeal 
proceedings, the state is allowed to rely upon material that is kept secret 
from the appellant.145 Only defense counsel has an opportunity to be 
heard during appeal proceedings as they are conducted in the absence of 
the suspect.146 Israeli courts have rarely accepted a detainee’s appeal 
regarding the prevention of the meeting with his attorney.147
Israeli law enumerates, then, the reasons justifying the postponement 
of the detainee-attorney meeting. In Center for Defense of the Individual 
v. IDF Commander of West Bank, a military commander issued a blanket 
order applicable to all detainees of the 2003 Defensive Wall 
Operation.148 The order precluded the detainees from meeting with their 
attorneys during the custodial period. In rejecting the petition against the 
order filed by four human rights organizations, the Israeli Supreme Court 
stated: 
 
[I]n our opinion it is inconceivable that during times of combat actions 
or thereabouts, the respondent will allow counsel[-]client meetings to 
people against whom there are suspicions that they endanger, or are 
liable to endanger, the security of the zone, the security of I.D.F forces, 
or of the public at large until conditions evolve that allow consideration 
of the individual circumstances of each particular detainee.149
 
The investigation by its very nature may strengthen or weaken the 
suspicion against a person in the commission of a criminal offense or the 
intention to commit one in the near future.150 The question is, however, 
why should the fact that the individual circumstances of the detainee 
have not yet been sufficiently clarified affect whether the meeting 
between the detainee and the advocate takes place? The Detention Law 
specifies different reasons for postponing the detainee-attorney meeting 
 142. Soofian, 47(2) P.D. at 852-53. 
 143. Detention Law, 1996, S.H. 1592 page 338 § 35(g). 
 144. Cr.A. 6613/99, Smirk v. Israel, 56(3) P.D. 529, 555-56. 
 145. H.C. 6302/92, Rumchia v. Israeli Police, 47(1) P.D. 209, 211; Tarek, 55(4) P.D. at 583. 
 146. See Detention Law, 1996, S.H. 1592 page 338 § 35(f). 
 147. See, e.g., H.C. 2568/90, Anon v. Israel, Tak-El 90(2), 423 (unpublished). 
 148. H.C. 2901/02, Center for Defense of the Individual v. IDF Commander of West Bank, 
56(3) P.D. 19. 
 149. Id. at 21. 
 150. Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 289 (2002). 
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that are mainly designed to prevent the obstruction of the 
investigation.151 This raises the question of how a meeting with an 
advocate leads to all of the grave consequences enumerated in the 
Detention Law justifying postponement of the meeting. The examination 
of Israeli case law that follows demonstrates the actual motivation for 
delay in allowing the detainee-attorney meeting to take place. 
 
1.  Obstruction of the investigation caused by meeting with an attorney 
 
In certain cases, the urgency of the investigation occasionally 
precludes the postponement of the detainee-attorney meeting when the 
offense is presently being committed, or is about to be committed, or 
where the danger exists of the disappearance of evidence, the 
disappearance of accessories, or the actual commission of the offense.152 
However, even in cases where an urgent investigation is crucial, there is 
no justification for the postponement of the detainee-attorney meeting for 
more than a few hours and certainly not for three weeks. Even during the 
course of an immediate investigation that takes place over several days, 
time can be found for a meeting between detainee and attorney. 
Another fear during investigatory proceedings is that the defense 
attorney will convey sensitive information to or from the suspect. This 
information may concern the fate of accomplices, in particular, whether 
any of them have been arrested and whether any of them made 
statements that incriminate the suspect. The defense attorney might 
discuss with the detainee information he heard from others, such as 
accomplices or other involved parties. It is also possible that defense 
counsel might warn a suspect or his accomplices about developments in 
the investigation. The relay of sensitive information by defense counsel 
may constitute criminal obstruction of justice.153 This kind of conduct on 
the part of an advocate is presumably rare,154 but the possibility that 
defense counsel might be conveying such information to the suspect 
cannot be ruled out altogether. Justice White, in Miranda, expressed this 
fear in another context, that of an attorney who represents individuals 
involved in organized crime. Such an attorney may ensure that each 
client remains silent whether or not it is in the client’s best interest to 
avoid incriminating others involved in the organized crime ring.155 
 151. Detention Law, 1996, S.H. 1592 page 338 § 34(d), 34(e), 35. 
 152. Jim Weller, The Legacy of Quarles: A Summary of the Public Safety Exception to 
Miranda in the Federal Courts, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 1107, 1114-15 (1997). 
 153. Compare with Regina v. Samuel, 2 All E.R. 135, 143 (C.A. 1988). 
 154. Id. at 143-44. 
 155. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 544 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
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However, Justice White’s fear can be dealt with on an attorney-by-
attorney basis and does not warrant the generalization that all defense 
attorneys will act in such an unethically questionable manner.156
There are several ways to overcome the general fear of relaying 
sensitive information from or to the suspect. For example, in Israeli 
military courts, only advocates who are authorized to deal with security 
secrets may represent suspects.157 Military personnel who are custodial 
suspects in the army may only consult with a military attorney or a 
defense counselor authorized to represent in military courts.158 Only 
defense counsel, whose loyalty to the State is deemed unwavering by the 
security services, receives this kind of authorization. Israeli Criminal 
Procedure Law broadens this concept to representation in civil courts, 
stipulating: 
 
Where the Minister of Defense has certified in writing that the security 
of the State necessitates such a restriction, a suspected or accused 
person shall not be entitled to be represented—whether in investigation 
proceedings or in proceedings before a judge or a court—save by a 
person authorized, by unrestricted authorization, to act as a defense 
counsel under section 318 of the Military Justice Law 1955.159
 
However, in the Soofian holding, Advocate Dan Yakir, the general 
counsel of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, petitioned on behalf 
of an individual suspected of security offenses who had been denied his 
detainee-attorney meeting.160 Advocate Yakir requested that the hearing 
to determine whether the postponement of his detainee-attorney meeting 
was justified be conducted in the detainee’s presence.161 Advocate Yakir 
had unrestricted authorization to represent in military courts. The Israeli 
Supreme Court rejected the application requesting the detainee’s 
presence stating that “conducting the session in the petitioner’s presence 
in the special circumstances of this case would undermine the prohibition 
on meetings between the petitioner and an attorney.”162 The Court did not 
give further explanation for not allowing any contact between Advocate 
Yakir and the detainee. It is unlikely that the Israeli Supreme Court 
suspected that Advocate Yakir would hinder the State’s investigation had 
 156. Samuel, 2 All E.R. at 144. 
 157. Military Justice Law, 1955, S.H. 189 page 171 § 318 (L.S.I.). 
 158. Id. at § 227A. 
 159. The Criminal Procedure Law, 1982, S.H. 1043 page 43 § 14 (L.S.I.). 
 160. H.C. 3412/91, Soofian v. IDF Commander in Aza Zone, 47(2) P.D. 843. 
 161. H.C. 3412/91, Soofian v. IDF Commander in Aza Zone, 47(2) P.D. 843, 856. 
 162. Id. 
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he been permitted to contact the detainee.163 The Court’s reasoning for 
affirming both the order that prohibited the meeting of the detainee with 
his defense counsel and the conduct of the judicial hearing in the 
detainee’s absence was not based, therefore, upon the suspicion of a 
particular attorney. 
Another fear expressed in Israeli case law regards the possibility that 
defense counsel may become an unwitting courier for sensitive 
information, as articulated in the following holdings.164 For example, a 
detainee may have made advance arrangements with his accomplices 
regarding secret codes that can be relayed by way of an innocent 
conversation with defense counsel. This may have been the fear 
expressed in Maraab,165 which adjudicated the legality of an order issued 
by military commander prohibiting all meetings between a detainee and 
his defense counsel.166 The order was initially for eighteen days but was 
subsequently reduced to four days.167 The Israeli Supreme Court affirmed 
the order rather laconically, stating that: 
 
[O]ur answer is that the rule in these kinds of situations must be the 
effectuation of the basic right to a meeting with an advocate. 
Nonetheless, important security considerations may prevent this. For 
example: in their response, the respondents argue that an advocate-
suspect meeting may be prevented if it is suspected that the lives of the 
combat forces may be endangered due to the possibility of messages 
being conveyed from detainment installations to the outside, overtly or 
encoded . . . we agree with this . . . accordingly, our view is that there 
was nothing defective in the arrangements prescribed in the order . . . 
with respect to preventing the meeting with an advocate.168
 
In the Chen holding, Israeli Supreme Court Justice Zamir, while 
presiding over an appeal to the decision of the President of the Jerusalem 
District Court, expressed fear that defense counsel could serve as an 
unwittingly courier of sensitive information.169 The issue in Chen was 
whether to permit a detainee-attorney meeting subject to the following 
 163. Compare with Samuel, 2 All E.R. at 145. In Samuel, the court noted that the police had 
illegally delayed the meeting between the detainee and his attorney, despite knowledge of the 
attorney’s identity as highly respected and experienced attorney unlikely to be hoodwinked by his 
twenty-four year old client. 
 164. See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text. 
 165. H.C. 3239/02, Maraab v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria Zone, 57(2) P.D. 349. 
 166. Id. at 356-59. 
 167. Id. at 358-59. 
 168. Id. at 381-82. 
 169. Cr.M 306/99, General Security Service v. Shimon Chen, Tak-El 99(1) 702 (unpublished). 
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restrictions: defense counsel would undertake not to relay any 
information from the outside to the detainee; the detainee would 
undertake not to relay any message, even innocent, to his advocate; 
defense counsel would not share with anyone any event, utterance, 
greeting, or any other information shared by the detainee; a 
representative from the General Security Service (GSS) could be present 
at the meeting.170 It is difficult to imagine a more restrictive situation to 
ensure that no information was leaked from the detainee to his defense 
counsel. The Israeli Supreme Court nonetheless quashed the decision of 
the President of the District Court and restored the validity of the blanket 
prohibition of the detainee-attorney meeting for three days.171 Defense 
counsel was permitted only to transfer a letter to his client indicating the 
following: (1) that he was aware of the suspect’s detention; (2) that he 
was unable to meet with the suspect; and (3) that defense counsel could 
inform the suspect of his statutory rights, including the right to remain 
silent.172 The Court held that when a serious threat to State security 
exists, regardless of its potential for materializing, a planned but 
disguised message, an accidental slip of the tongue, and even a 
presumably innocent statement, might be meaningful, and perhaps even 
lethal.173 It is, however, rare for an advocate to unwittingly transfer 
information174 as this requires both a sophisticated detainee and naivety 
and stupidity on behalf of the advocate.175 Though a tremendous degree 
of sophistication can be ascribed to certain security detainees, there is no 
reason to assume all defense attorneys are naive.176
One way of assessing the intention underlying the suspension of a 
right is to examine whether there is a less restrictive means for achieving 
the same goal. The fears concerning the interference of an investigation 
as a result of a detainee-attorney meetings can be overcome by limiting 
the right of communication at the preliminary stages to certain attorneys 
while also imposing a prohibition on transferring any message to or from 
the suspect. These attorneys should be drawn from those who have 
unrestricted authorization to serve in military courts and defense 
attorneys who belong to the internal staff of the public defender’s 
office.177 It is unlikely that a defense counsel with unrestricted 
 170. Id. at § 5 of the holding. 
 171. Id. at § 7 of the holding. 
 172. Id. at § 8 of the holding. 
 173. Id. at § 7 of the holding. 
 174. Regina v. Samuel, 2 All E.R. 135, 144 (C.A. 1988). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Compare the position of the English Criminal Appeals Court that regards the fear of an 
innocent transmission of information on the part of attorneys that pertain to Duty Solicitors as 
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authorization would violate this prohibition and convey, even 
accidentally, any information to or from the suspect. True, this 
suggestion violates the detainee’s right to retain a counsel of his own 
choice.178 However, it violates the detainee’s rights to silence and 
counsel to a lesser degree than a total ban on meeting with counsel. 
However, the fact that no method to minimize the potential damage of a 
detainee-attorney meeting has been proposed short of a blanket 
prohibition on such meetings indicates that its postponement is not solely 
premised on the fear of leaked information. 
 
2.  Defense counsel and the right to silence 
 
There is a fear that the number of statements made by the detainee to 
his interrogators and admissions of guilt will decrease as defense counsel 
is allowed to inform the detainee of his right to remain silent. The Israeli 
Supreme Court does not regard this as a valid argument for delaying a 
detainee-attorney meeting. On the contrary, the Court has ruled that the 
fear of an attorney influencing the detainee to avoid making any 
statement to the police does not constitute valid cause for delaying that 
meeting.179 The fact that the custodial suspect has not yet made a 
statement to the police does not, of itself, provide a reason for denying 
him a detainee-attorney meeting nor does the assessment that the suspect 
will be unwilling to cooperate with the police if such a meeting takes 
place.180 The Court stressed that infringement of a suspect’s right to meet 
with counsel is “tolerated only when critical from the perspective of 
security needs and necessary in terms of the advancement of the 
investigation. Regarding the advancement of the investigation . . . it must 
be shown that a meeting between the detainee and the attorney will 
interfere with the investigation.”181 It is not legal to postpone a detainee-
attorney meeting out of fear that defense counsel will alleviate the 
custodial pressure or inform the suspect of his right to remain silent, as 
long as it remains a recognized right.182 These decisions imply that 
silence alone does not obstruct an investigation, as opposed to active 
means of obstruction such as warning other accomplices or giving 
negligible. Id. 
 178. Regarding the defendant’s right to have the assistance of a retained lawyer of his 
choosing, see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961). 
 179. Cr.A. 307/60, Yasin v. Attorney General, 17P.D. 1541, 1570. 
 180. Compare with English case law: Van Kessel, supra note 49, at 55. 
 181. H.C. 6302/92, Rumchia v. Israeli Police, 47(1) P.D. 209, 213; H.C. 128/84, Hazan v. 
Meir, 38(2) P.D. 24, 27. 
 182. Regina v. Samuel, 2 All E.R. 135, 144 (C.A. 1988). 
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instructions to hide evidence that an investigation has been impeded.183
As elucidated in Miranda, the postponement of the attorney-detainee 
meeting is intended to “overcome” the tight connection between the right 
of counsel and the right to silence.184 The Sharitach decision, which 
involved a security suspect, provided proof of this proposition.185 In 
Sharitach, the Israeli Supreme Court not only affirmed the decision to 
bar a detainee-attorney meeting, but also rejected the attorney’s request 
to inform the detainee of his right to silence and that his family had 
retained an attorney.186 In their brief decision on November 27, 2001, 
entailing only a few lines, Justices Cheshin, Shtrasberg-Cohen and 
Dorner stated: 
 
Petitioner is aware that a meeting between himself and an attorney was, 
and is still prohibited. However, Advocate Rozental . . . requests that 
petitioner be informed that people on the outside have appointed an 
attorney—Advocate Rozental—to represent him. We put the question 
to the respondent and his representatives, and we are satisfied that 
informing the petitioner of this, in addition to informing him of the 
prohibition on his meeting with an advocate—will harm the 
‘advancement of the investigation.’ Advocate Rozental further requests 
that he be permitted to convey a letter to the petitioner, informing him 
of his right to remain silent during interrogation and not to incriminate 
himself. Here too we have listened to the respondent and his 
representatives, and in this matter too we are satisfied that the 
‘advancement of the investigation’ and the ‘security of the region’ 
prevent us from assenting to Advocate Rozental’s request.187
 
Moreover, in opposition to previous explicit holdings of the Israeli 
Supreme Court, according to which a detainee must immediately be 
informed of the denial of a detainee-attorney meeting,188 in the case of 
Basaam Natshe, the Court ignored this precedent.189 Justice Cheshin 
determined in this case that although “[t]he petitioner’s attorney 
requested that the petitioner be informed of the prohibition on his 
 183. Supra note 181. 
 184. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469  (1966). 
 185. H.C. 9314/01, Usama Ali Sharitach v. General Security Service, Tak-El 2001 (3) 645 
(unpublished). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See H.C. 3412/91, Soofian v. IDF Commander in Aza Zone, 47(2) P.D. 843, 852-53; 
H.C. 3425/01, Tarek v. Minister of Defense, 55(4) P.D. 581, 583. 
 189. H.C. 801/00, Basaam Nachsha v. Erez Military Court, Tak-El 2000 (1) 359 
(unpublished). 
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meeting with an attorney, [the Court has] assented to the State’s request 
not to inform the petitioner, and for the same reasons for which he was 
not permitted to meet with his attorney.”190 These decisions attest to the 
dual nature of Israeli law regarding the right to remain silent and the 
right to a detainee-attorney meeting during the investigation stage. 
In Escobedo, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the 
Constitution strikes a balance in favor of the accused’s right to be 
advised by defense counsel of the privilege against self-incrimination.191 
A legal system should not abhor the right of a suspect to confer with 
counsel in order to become aware of his rights, unless there is a basic 
defect in that system.192 Professor Yoram Shachar, an Israeli 
commentator, similarly noted that: 
 
Apparently, the main fear inducing investigating authorities to 
interrogate before the meeting is their fear of the defense counsel’s 
ability to inform the suspect of the panoply of his legal rights during 
the interrogation, especially the right of silence. If indeed this is the 
fear, then it expresses deep contempt for the rule of law and human 
dignity. The essence of the Law is its public enactment, and it is 
directed at people to know it. An interrogator seeking to exploit the 
ignorance of a person unaware of his statutory rights, and refuses to 
allow an attorney to inform him of his rights at precisely the moment 
when he most requires them . . . does not give him equal treatment and 
respect. Even if his intentions are commendable, his actions are not.193
 
V.  THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN INVESTIGATION INTENDED TO 
UNCOVER A CRIMINAL OF A PAST OFFENSE AND AN INVESTIGATION 
AIMED AT PREVENTING A FUTURE OFFENSES 
 
Israeli Law may be rescued from its apparently conflicting rulings 
and the chasm between rhetoric and reality by drawing a distinction 
between investigations intended to discover a criminal of a past offense 
and investigations intended to obtain information aimed at preventing 
future offenses. The Detention Law permits the postponement of the 
detainee-attorney meeting without regard to a distinction between these 
two types of investigations.194 However, the Israeli Supreme Court has 
 190. Id. 
 191. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964). 
 192. Id. at 490. 
 193. Yoram Shachar, Criminal Procedure, in ANNUAL YEARBOOK OF LAW IN ISRAEL 375, 
400 (1993). 
 194. Detention Law, 1996, S.H. 1592 page 338 § 35 (L.S.I.). 
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drawn this distinction in Smirk.195 Smirk, a German citizen who had 
joined Hezbollah, was detained after arriving in Israel on charges of 
taking photos of targets for suicide attacks.196 In his appeal following 
conviction, Smirk claimed, inter alia, improper elicitation of his out-of-
court incriminating statements without notification of his right to remain 
silent and right to counsel.197 Dismissing his claim, the Smirk Court 
distinguished between investigations conducted for the purpose of 
obtaining information necessary to prevent the commission of a future 
offense against state security and an investigation intended to connect a 
suspect with a past offense.198 The first case does not trigger a duty to 
apprise the detainee of the right to silence.199 This distinction can explain 
the ruling in Sharitach.200 If there is no obligation on behalf of law 
enforcement authorities to apprise the detainee of his right to remain 
silent, then likewise, it follows logically that there is no need of defense 
counsel to inform the detainee of this right. The right to counsel fits into 
a legal system that recognizes the suspect’s right to remain silent during 
his investigation. In a legal system which does not recognize a right to 
remain silent or where law enforcement authorities are permitted to try to 
prevent the suspect from exercising the right to remain silent, a defense 
attorney is regarded as a hindrance to the discovery of the truth. 
The Smirk Court201 assumed that a case involving an imminent act of 
terrorism is beyond the confines of a standard police investigation. 
Indeed, in a case such as this, the General Security Service (GSS), not 
the police, controls the investigation of terrorist suspects. GSS 
interrogators do not take written statements from the suspect. After the 
GSS investigation is concluded, the suspect is transferred to the police 
for continued interrogation. Only then is a written statement taken and is 
the suspect informed of his right to remain silent and, if the prohibition 
on a meeting has been removed, of his right to meet with defense 
counsel.202
In New York v. Quarles, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
the “public safety exception” to the Miranda ruling.203 When the 
immediate investigation of the suspect is required to protect the public, 
 195. Cr. A. 6613/99, Smirk v. Israel, 56(3) P.D. 529. 
 196. Id. at 535. 
 197. Id. at 539. 
 198. Id. at 545-46. 
 199. Id. 
 200. H.C. 9314/01, Usama Ali Sharitach v. General Security Service, Tak-El 2001 (3) 645 
(unpublished). 
 201. 56(3) P.D. 529. 
 202. Id. at 547. 
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there is no need to notify him of his rights to silence and counsel.204 In 
Quarles, the complainant notified the police that she had just been raped, 
and that the rapist had entered a nearby supermarket, armed with a 
gun.205 One of the police officers entered the supermarket and began 
pursuing a person whose description matched that given by the 
complainant.206 At the end of the pursuit, the police officer grabbed the 
suspect, handcuffed him, and asked him for the location of the gun.207 
The suspect pointed to some empty cartons and responded, “the gun is 
over there.”208 The Court ruled that in this circumstance, though the 
police officer questioned the suspect without giving him the required 
Miranda warnings, the confession and the gun were admissible 
evidence.209 The Court thereby balanced the interests of the suspect’s 
rights against the need to obtain information necessary to protect public 
safety and security. 
The Quarles Court did not define the extent of this public safety 
exception thereby opening the door for potential abuse by law 
enforcement authorities in general and the police force in particular.210 
This ambiguity in the public safety exception and the fact that a criminal 
at large poses a threat to the public safety might give rise to a broad 
exception to the Miranda ruling.211 If by “[l]eaving a criminal’s gun at 
large creates a danger to the public, but leaving the criminal who wields 
the gun at large creates an even greater danger,”212 then conceivably, it 
may become legitimate to investigate dangerous criminals without 
recognition of their rights to silence or counsel.213 This is further 
supported by the assumption that some criminals who are not indicted 
due to a lack of sufficient evidence or who are acquitted at trial will 
continue, nonetheless, to endanger public safety through the commission 
of additional offenses.214 The Miranda Court recognized that letting 
criminals go free (with the knowledge that some of them may repeat their 
crimes) is an inevitable price the public must pay to secure a detainee’s 
 204. Id. at 653. 
 205. Id. at 651-52. 
 206. Id. at 652. 
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privilege against self-incrimination. The dissenting opinion highlighted 
the danger of slowing down the investigation in cases in which time is of 
the essence, such as kidnapping, crimes involving national security, and 
offenses committed by organized crime.215 Notwithstanding the 
preference given in Miranda to the right to counsel over the interest in 
public safety, the Quarles Court established the public safety exception. 
Given this exception, and despite the difficulty of determining the exact 
scope of the implications of the Quarles decision, it is hard to dispute the 
fact that terror offenses constitute a clear threat to public safety and can 
therefore justify the application of the public safety exception. This is 
particularly true for suspects that have information regarding imminently 
scheduled terror offenses.216 The United States Supreme Court, to date, 
has not definitively ruled on the question of whether the public safety 
exception can permit the continued interrogation of a suspect who 
requests a consultation with his defense counsel.217 Some commentators 
hold that proper policy considerations mandate broad application of the 
exception in these circumstances to prevent the future commission of 
crimes against state security.218 Indeed, the Israeli Detention Law permits 
a postponement of the detainee-counsel meeting for three weeks even 
when the detainee explicitly requests to meet with his lawyer.219 This 
time frame enables the “subjugation” of the natural unwillingness of 
terror suspects to cooperate with their interrogators by isolating them 
from the outside world. If this approach is accepted in the United States 
under the exception of New York v. Quarles, it will expand the options 
for preventing the detainee-attorney meeting both by allowing an ample 
delay in apprising the detainee of his rights and by permitting the 
investigation to continue even when the detainee has invoked his right to 
counsel. 
One conceivable approach is to render inadmissible any evidence 
obtained by law enforcement authorities in the prevention of future 
crimes if they deny a suspect the ability to effectuate his rights. Justice 
Marshall, in Quarles, noted that if a bomb were about to explode in a 
crowd or if there was an immediate threat to national security, a suspect 
should be able to be interrogated without advising him of his rights 
 215. Id. at 544. 
 216. See Darmer, supra note 133, at 372. On the basis of analogy from the Quarles exception, 
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though his confession would not be admissible at trial.220 Such a ruling 
avoids the abridgement of the interrogated suspect’s rights under the 
guise of preventing the commission of an offense. It would force law 
enforcement authorities to choose one of two paths and prevent them 
from having their cake and eating it too.221 However, the Quarles 
majority refused to impose this requirement on law enforcement 
authorities. The Court determined it unwise to force law enforcement 
authorities to balance the need to protect public safety against the desire 
to enforce the law and convict criminals; choosing the former would 
mean sacrificing evidence against the suspect.222 When interrogating a 
suspect who poses a threat to public safety, the desire to uncover the 
criminal who committed past offenses is inseparable from the desire to 
protect public safety from the commission of future offenses.223 The 
Quarles majority held, therefore, that once a police officer acted 
appropriately by interrogating a suspect without giving the Miranda 
warnings, there is no justification for punishing him by excluding the 
suspect’s confessions.224
When dealing with terror suspects it is difficult to oblige law 
enforcement authorities to choose ad hoc between preventing additional 
imminent terrorist attacks and the desire to convict and punish criminals 
for past terrorist acts and thus preventing future crimes by their 
imprisonment. Additionally, the boundaries of the public safety 
exception are more easily delineated in cases of terror suspects, the vast 
majority of whom are presumed to be in possession of valuable 
information that may prevent future terrorist acts. This is based on an 
assumption that has not yet been proven at the interrogative stage, that 
they are indeed factually guilty. 
However, interrogating those suspected of state security offenses 
without apprising them of their rights to silence and counsel opens the 
door for grave abuse of interrogation powers where counsel is not 
present to ensure that the detainee is not coerced to give an admission by 
violence, threats, or another kind of undue pressure. The temptation to 
exert undue pressure in interrogations of individuals suspected of 
security offences is particularly acute. In these cases, an overriding 
public concern exists to detect the criminals and neutralize imminent 
dangers. In addition, interrogators in situations like these often feel 
 220. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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tremendous hatred towards detainees who are prepared to undermine the 
state. During these public safety interrogations there may, therefore, be 
even a greater need for defense counsel to be present. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Suspects of terror offenses pose a special challenge to law 
enforcement authorities and may tilt the scales toward the needs of law 
enforcement and the protection of public security over individual rights. 
The Israeli Detention Law allows the postponement of the detainee-
attorney meeting for suspects of security offenses for up to three weeks, 
as opposed to two days for suspects of other offenses. The detainee-
attorney meeting of a suspect of a security offense is automatically 
delayed for a certain period of time. The Israeli Supreme Court has never 
openly acknowledged that it permits the delaying of the detainee-
attorney meeting to pressure a suspect of security offenses into speaking 
by keeping him incommunicado and failing to inform him of his rights. 
On the contrary, the Israeli Supreme Court has made it clear that the fear 
of the detainee asserting his right to silence does not alone justify a delay 
in the detainee-attorney meeting. However, analysis of the decisions in 
which the Israeli Supreme Court affirmed sweeping prohibitions on 
detainee-attorney meetings of security detainees indicates that this indeed 
is the covert purpose of prohibiting the meeting between the detainee and 
his counsel. The Israeli Supreme Court nonetheless refuses to explicitly 
admit this proposition. This refusal to admit that the postponement of the 
detainee-attorney meeting is designed to overcome the detainee’s will to 
remain silent prevents a serious discussion of the boundaries of the right 
to silence, and the appropriate limitations for the detainee’s right of 
communication with an attorney, especially in the case of security-
offense detainees. It forestalls consideration of the possible distinction 
between investigations intended to gather evidence to substantiate a 
suspect’s guilt where a delayed meeting with the defense attorney for 
pressuring the suspect should be regarded as illegitimate, and an 
investigation intended to prevent the commission of an imminent 
dangerous offense. There are circumstances in which the abridgement of 
the right of consultation with a defense counsel, and consequently the 
privilege against self-incrimination, may be justified, such as in 
interrogations of terror suspects where there is a reasonable ground for 
assuming that they carry information regarding imminent terror offenses. 
In such cases however, suitable procedural safeguards should be 
instituted, such as video recording of the interrogation, to prevent abuse 
of the authority to delay detainee-attorney meeting for security suspects 
in order to elicit coerced confessions. 
